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Compelled Commercial Speech as Compelled Consent
Speech
Leslie Gielow Jacobs•
The topic of this symposium is "compelled commercial speech," and
that is certainly one way to cut through the cases. This grouping seems to
fit nicely into the existing Free Speech Clause categories. We have fully
protected speech and commercial speech , and, within both of these areas,
we have speech restraints and speech that a government entity compels the
speaker to say. Commercial speech may be subject to greater government
regulation than fully protected speech because the reason that the
Constitution . protects it is different. 1 Similarly, government entities may
compel commercial speakers to disclose information more freely than they
may compel individuals to utter fully protected speech. 2 In fact, in the
realm of fully protected speech , government-imposed compulsions are
subject to the same high level of scrutiny as speech restraints. 3 This
symmetry of treatment between speech compulsions and speech restraints
does not, however, exist within commercial speech. The Constitution
permits government entities to compel commercial speech more freely than
they may restrain commercial speech ,4 and only one Justice on the current
Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to reexamine this principle. 5
Despite the fact that the standards of review for speech restraints and
compulsions do not align precisely within the category of commercial
speech as they do with fully protected speech, it would be possible to
create a perfectly sensible jurisprudence by segregating the category of
compelled commercial speech . The Court in Zauderer v. Office of
• Thanks to Maureen Moran for helpful assistance with citations .
1
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976) (commercial speech is entitled to "a different degree of [Free Speech Clause) protection" than
fully protected speech) .
2
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
( 1985) ("[T]he interests at stake [where a government entity compels commercial speech disclosures J
are not of the same order as those [where the government compels individuals to utter fully protected
speech].") .
3
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (state may not compel individual to
display "Live Free or Die" on his vehicle license plate); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ . v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (state may not compel a child to recite the pledge of allegiance).
4
Compare Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (strict scrutiny applies to fully protected compelled speech),
with Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 647 (rational basis scrutiny applies to compelled commercial speech).
5
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , PA v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("I am skeptical of the premis e . . . that, in the commercial speech context, 'the First
Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirement s are substantially weaker than those at stake
when speech is actually suppressed. "' (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n. 14)).

517

518

Journal of Law & Politics

[Vol.XXIX:517

Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio 6 started down this road
by noting that because a different justification underlies the protection of
commercial speech, 7 disclosure requirements imposed on commercial
speakers do not present the same Free Speech Clause danger as
commercial speech restraints. 8 The Court explicitly noted that the
symmetry of speech doctrine that applies to restraints and compulsions of
fully protected speech does not apply to commercial speech.9 The potential
for confusion in compelled speech doctrine arises, however, because the
Court's interpretations of the scope of cmporate speech rights 10 and of the
protection of commercial speakers from speech restraints 11 has been
ratcheting upward . Corporate speakers have seized the opportunity to
challenge government-imposed disclosure requirements over and over
again, arguing that commercial speech compulsions should be reviewed
under the same heightened standard as commercial speech restraints. 12
These efforts have been effective, resulting in a smattering of inconsistent
lower court decisions, as some courts hew to the Zauderer speech
6

471 U.S. 626.
Id. at 651 ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides ... appellant's
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising
is minimal." (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976))).
8
Id. at 651 n.14.
9
Id. at 651 ("[By compelling commercial speech, the stateJ has not attempted to 'prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.' The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that
appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms
under which his services will be available." (citation omitted) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)).
10
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that
corporations and labor unions have political speech rights).
II
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (invalidating state restriction
on sale of commercial information while finding unconstitutional content-based and speaker-based
distinctions within the category of commercial speech); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 371 (2002) (invalidating restriction on advertising of compounded drugs and holding that the
government did not prove that less restrictive means were not available).
12
The Washington Legal Foundation litigates on behalf of corporate speech rights. As to its
interpretations of compelled commercial speech doctrine, see, e.g., Sarah Roller & Donnelly
McDowell, Biotech Food Labeling Proposal Raises First Amendment Concerns, LEGALOPINION
LETTER (Wash.
Legal
Found.,
D.C.),
Oct.
19,
2012,
at
I, available
at http://www.wlf.org/upload/Iegalstudies/legalopinionletter / I 0- I 9-12RollerMcDowell_Lega!OpinionL
etter.pdf; Sarah Roller & Donnelly McDowell, "FOP" Food Labeling: The Energy Star® Model
Raises First Amendment Concerns (Wash. Legal Found . Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series,
No. I 80, 2012), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies /workingpaper/RollerMcDowell
WPFINAL.pdf; Charles M. English, Compelled Speech And The First Amendment: Neutral Fact Or
Government Opinion?, LEGALBACKGROUNDER
(Wash. Legal Found., D.C.), Jan. 13, 2012, at I,
available athttp ://www.wlf.org/upload/Iegalstudies /legalbackgrounder/1- I 3-12English_Lega!Backgro
under.pdf.
7
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restraint/disclosure requirement line and others look to the Court's
changing commercial speech restraint jurisprudence as a signal to tighten
judicial review of disclosure requirements. 13 Therefore, the theoretical
distinctions that could have worked are not working in practice. The
jurisprudence of compelled commercial speech is becoming warped due to
the pull of other lines of cases that relate only superficially . To solidify the
core of the compelled commercial speech cases, it is helpful to slice
through the instances of government speech compulsions in a different
way.
Rather than grouping compelled commercial speech cases as a class to
themselves, it is useful to recognize that most of these cases involve
government compelled speech in connection with a sale transaction, and
that compelled disclosures in the context of sale transactions are part of a
broader group of compelled disclosures in interpersonal transactions.
Viewing the cases this way makes a number of points clear. First,
governments effectively require communication between parties to
commercial transactions all the time as a routine, ordinary and accepted
exercise of state police power or of the federal government's Commerce
Clause power. Second, there is no basis in the Constitution to limit the
deferential review of commercial disclosure requirements, articulated in
Zauderer and reaffirmed in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States 14 to disclosure requirements aimed at correcting deceptive or
misleading commercial speech. Rather, those instances are properly
viewed as part of a subset of broader government authority to define the
facts material to the consent that makes an interpersonal transaction legal
and enforceable. Third, recognizing the inherent government power to
define the facts material to valid consent makes sense of the subset of
compelled commercial speech cases . It identifies the few disclosure
requirements that fall out of bounds, and it makes clear that the primary
13
Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (interpreting Zauderer and more recent Court cases as establishing "that a disclosure requirement
is only appropriate if the government shows that , absent a warning , there is a self-evident - or at least
'potentially real ' - danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers " (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't
of Bus. & Prof! Regulation , 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994))) , with id. at 1227 n.6 (Rogers , J., dissenting)
("As other circuits have recognized, in Zauderer the Supreme Court appears simply to have held that a
government interest in protecting consumers from possible deception is sufficient to support a
disclosure requirement - not that this particular interest is necessary to support such a requirement. "
(citing Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 650-51 ; Disc . Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
556 (6th Cir . 2012) ; N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C . Bd. of Health , 556 F.3d 114, 133 & n.21 (2d Cir.
2009) ; Pharm . Care Mgmt. Ass ' n v. Rowe , 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (!st Cir. 2005) ; Nat ' ! Elec. Mfrs .
Ass'n v. Sorell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001))) .
14
559 U.S. 229 (2010) .
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work to be done in the compelled speech jurisprudence is to identify what
limits the Constitution places on the types of information governments
require commercial speakers to present and how they must present it, not
to argue over whether the government has the authority to require
disclosures at all - it clearly does.
A recent case decided in the Southern District of New York provides a
useful structure that illustrates each of these points. The case does not
clearly involve commercial speech. 15 In fact, the court held that it did not
involve compelled speech at all. The case, Central Rabbinical Congress of
the USA & Canada v. New York City Department of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 16 involved an amendment to the New York City Health Code,
enacted in 2012, addressing the practice of direct oral suction circumcision
performed in certain Orthodox Jewish communities on baby boys. 17 After
two babies died following the procedure because of germ transfer, 18 the
New York regulation requires the rabbis, or mohelim, to obtain written
consent from the boys' parents before performing the procedure . The
consent form may be supplied by the Department of Health or by the rabbi,
but it must contain the following statement:
I understand that direct oral suction will be performed on
my child and that the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene advises parents that direct oral
suction should not be performed because it exposes an
infant to the risk of transmission of herpes simplex virus
infection, which may result in brain damage or death. 19
The mohelim claimed that the consent form requirement
unconstitutionally compelled them to speak.20 The court held that the

15
The case involves a disclosure requirement imposed on the procedure of ritual circumcision. It is
not clear in the case whether parents pay a fee to have the procedure performed .
16
No. 12 Civ. 7590(NRB) , 2013 WL 126399 (S.D .N.Y. Jan. IO, 2013) .
17
Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to Article 181 of the New York City Health Code, 139 CITY
REC.2600 (Sept. 21, 2012) .
18
Cent. Rabbini cal Cong., 2013 WL 126399, at •9 ("[T]he Department had found, since 2000 ,
eleven laboratory-confirmed cases of neonatal herpes in infants who had undergone a circumcision that
definitely or likely involved direct oral suction . Of those eleven cases, two infants died and two
suffered brain damage." (footnote and citation omitted)) .
19 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTHCODE§ 181.21 (2012) .
20 The mohelim claimed that the regulation unconstitutionally compelled them "' to pass along the
Department's "advice" against [the procedure]"' and that strict scrutiny should apply. Cent. Rabbini cal
Cong., 2013 WL 126399, at *20 (citing Plaintiff's Motion at 5).
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consent form requirement did not force them to speak. 21 It dealt with the
claim as a facial challenge, and looked to whether "'no set of
circumstances"' could render the requirement valid. 22 According to the
court, parents could obtain the consent form from the Health Department
website, or a pediatrician's office, which would "not involve
communicative action by the mohelim" 23 and even in the odd circumstance
where parents could not locate a form without the mohel 's assistance, "the
mohel would still be free not to say anything or otherwise to undertake any
communicative act" because, in lieu of speaking, he "simply could not
perform [the procedure]" and "there would be no compelled speech." 24
The result seems correct - the Constitution must permit a government
agency to make certain that parents know they are choosing a procedure
that carries the risk of death for their infant. But the conclusion that the
government does not compel speech en route to this result cannot be right.
At the very least, the parents are required to consent to the procedure by
signing the form, and the mohelim are required to receive it. This is an act
of communication that the government compels as a condition to engaging
in an activity. It is no response that the individual can avoid the
compulsion simply by refraining from engaging in the activity. It would
not be a response in the core compelled speech cases - that Marie and
Gathie Barnett could avoid the compelled speech inherent in the flag salute
by staying home from school 25 or that George Maynard and his wife could
avoid broadcasting New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto by failing
to own or drive a car 26 - and it is not an adequate response in this instance
either. The New York City Health Department regulation compels speech,
but the court was correct that it is not constitutionally suspect compelled
speech of the flag salute or license plate variety . Because the ritual
circumcision case involves a challenge to an explicitly labeled "consent
form," it helpfully lays bare what is really going on in most of the
compelled commercial speech cases. The government is defining the facts
21
Id. at •21 ("Nowhere in the regulation are mohelim required to provide a consent form to parents
or even to inform parents that such a form exists.").
22
Id. (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2534 (2012) (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))).
23 Id.
2• Id.
25
These sisters were the daughters of the lead plaintiff in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). David L. Hudson, Jr., Speech Commentary: Woman in Barnette
Reflects on Famous Flag-Salute Case, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Dec. 28, 2009),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/woman-in-barnette-reflects-on-famous-flag-salute-case
(noting
that due to a clerk's error, the case name misspells their last name, which was Barnett).
26
Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705 (1977) .
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that are material to creating legal and enforceable consent to an
interpersonal transaction.
This case of consent-to-circumcision illustrates my first point, which is
that government entities require consent all the time without triggering
heightened Free Speech Clause scrutiny. An agreement to have a mohel
perform a circumcision is a contract. 27 A contract is an act of compelled
communication - there must be offer and acceptance, and acceptance must
entail consent. "Consent," however, is a term of art, which may be defined
thinly or robustly by the state. 28 Governments have long required that
"material" facts be disclosed to create a valid and enforceable contract.
Fact finders may make the determination of which facts are material to a
particular contract if its validity must be decided at trial. Alternatively,
legislative or regulatory bodies may spell out facts material to particular
contracts. And the judgments of these various decision makers may vary as
to which facts are "material" and must be disclosed to create valid
consent.29 In either of these instances, the government compels the parties
to a contract to communicate facts that the particular decision maker
determines are relevant to the informed consent that makes the contract
valid and enforceable.
This government regulatory power to require the disclosure of facts
material to informed consent is not limited to commercial contracts.
Consent is a crucial element that renders many types of transactions legal
and enforceable. Governments have always had the authority to define the
facts that must be communicated and the circumstances that must exist to
create this critical element of consent. Indeed, this regulatory authority
extends deep into our everyday lives. Specifically, consent is often the
crucial element that defines when transactions are torts or crimes. The
doctrine of informed consent to medical procedures marks the line between
a valid transaction and an assault or battery. 30 Thus, government entities
compel the communication of facts they determine are material to
informed consent and the reciprocal communication of consent every time
we see a doctor to avoid tort liability. And this requirement of bilateral
27
Mohelim are usually paid for their services, although they may not charge a set price. See Dovid
Zaklikowski , No Set Payment for the Circumcision?: How Much Does a Mahe/ Cost?,
CHABAD,http: //www. chabad.org/library /article_cdo /aid/1668419 /jewish/No-Set-Payment-for-the-Circ
umcision .htm (last visited Feb. 25 , 2014) .
28 See Brian H. Bix , Contracts, in THE ETHICSOF CONSENT:THEORYAND PRACTICE251 (Franklin
G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 20 I 0).
29
See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of "Material " in Securities
law , 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 167 (2011).
30
Peter M . Murray , The History of Informed Consent, 10 IOWAORTHOPAEDI
C J. 104 (1990).
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communication of information and consent is not limited to the medical
context where it evolved. It applies in any context where a touching would
otherwise constitute a tort. For example, dentists, hair dressers, massage
therapists and others must communicate information and secure consent.
Consent makes what would be a theft legal. And the government
effectively compels speech every time we have sex, because without the
communication of consent, either implicitly or explicitly, the act is a
crime. 31 The requirement that mohelim secure informed consent to perform
a circumcision is no different than all of these other instances of day-to-day
activities in which one party must secure consent to a physical touching or
else face legal liability. The bottom line is that compelled speech to secure
informed consent to interpersonal transactions is an ordinary exercise of
government regulatory authority to protect health, safety and welfare.
My second point is that the government power to require disclosures as
part of a commercial transaction is not limited to correcting affirmatively
"deceptive" or "misleading" speech. 32 Although Zauderer and Milavetz
dealt with situations where the government required disclosures to correct
deceptive or misleading speech, 33 there is no constitutional basis for
limiting deferential review to that circumstance. The category of
"deceptive" or "misleading" speech is not even actionable fraud; it does
not otherwise have determinate meaning. 34 The pertinent question is why
the government has the authority to require corrections to misleading
speech. The broader authority is to define what facts must be disclosed to
constitute valid and enforceable consent.
31
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 130.05(1) (McKinney 2013)("Whether ornot specifically stated, it
is an element of every offense defined in this article that the sexual act was committed without consent
of the victim.").
32
The Court in 'Zauderer articulated the rational basis standard of review in connection with the
state's purpose of preventing consumer deception , and corporate litigants have seized on this language
to argue that it limits the scope of judicial deference to commercial speech disclosure requirements. See
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
("[W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected so long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception ofconsumers.") .
33
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010) ("[The] required
disclosures are intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements specifically, the promise of debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy ,
which has inherent costs."); 'Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653 ("The State's position that it is deceptive to
employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability
for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability
for costs be disclosed.").
34
See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False " is: Falsity and
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) ('"The
distinction between the true and the misleading is normative."' (quoting Steven Shiffiin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw .
U. L. REv . 1212, 1219 (1983))).
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The evolution of informed consent to medical procedures usefully
illustrates the scope of the government's police power to compel disclosure
of facts to ensure consent. The informed consent requirement began as an
antidote inserted by the common law to respond to the practice of
deceiving patients about the medical procedures to which they were
submitting. 35 In its early manifestations, the doctrine required factual
disclosures in order to counteract affirmative deception. As it has evolved,
it has required a broad range of factual disclosures to fully inform a patient
of the risks and benefits of a medical procedure in instances where no
affirmative deceptive or misleading speech exists. The informed consent
requirements have moved from common law to statutes in many
jurisdictions, with the elements varying according to the judgments of the
legislative decision makers. 36 Throughout this evolution, it has been
assumed that the power to require these factual disclosures and define their
specific terms falls within the state's power to protect health , safety and
welfare, subject to deferential rational basis review.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 37 the
plurality addressed the claim that disclosures to secure informed consent to
abortion should be subject to greater than rational basis review.
Pennsylvania required that the abortion provider inform the woman
seeking an abortion "of the availability of printed material published by the
State describing the fetus and providing information about medical
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father,
and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as
alternatives to abortion." 38 In response to the abortion providers' claim that
the disclosure requirement unconstitutionally compelled them to speak, the
plurality reasoned :

35 See

Murray, supra note 30.
See Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decision Making Process, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 163 (I 984); Background: Requirements for Informed Consent, A Practical Guide to Informed
Consent, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM, http://www .templehealth.org/lCTOOLKIT /
html/ictoolkitpage5.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) ("Informed consent is an ethical concept-that all
patient s should understand and agree to the potential consequences of their care----that has become
codified in the law and in daily practice at every medical institution . ... The case law and rules
pertaining to informed consent have changed over the years and all 50 states now have legislation that
requires some level of inform ed consent. Although the details of these laws vary from state to state, the
bottom line is that failure to obtain informed consent renders any U.S . physician liable for negligence
or battery and constitute s medi cal malpractice ." (citation omitted)).
37
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
38
Id. at 881.
36
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To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to
speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by
the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the
requirement that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here. 39
Although the plurality's explanation could have been less terse, its
conclusion that factual disclosure requirements imposed upon doctors are
subject to rational basis review because they fall within the state's
licensing authority is consistent with the broad authority that government
entities have always enjoyed to require and define the facts material to
informed consent.
The Casey plurality's affirmation that rational basis review applies to
abortion disclosure requirements reveals that there is no basis to limit
government authority to require disclosures in commercial contexts to
those necessary to counter affirmatively deceptive or misleading speech.
The particular factual disclosures at issue in Casey were not required to
prevent deception. The doctors proposing to perform abortions had not said
anything affirmatively deceptive or misleading about the developmental
stage of the fetuses or the options available to women if they chose
·childbirth. 40 The government imposed the disclosure requirements to
remind women to think beyond their own interests to consider the welfare
of the fetus.41 Despite the fact that patients would not be deceived or
misled by an absence of speech, the plurality found that the state had broad
police power authority to require doctors to disclose facts the government
had decided were relevant - or should be relevant - to women's consent to
abortion procedures. 42
The Court's decisions in Zauderer and Milavetz addressed disclosure
requirements imposed in response to advertisements. In this context, the
Court stated that the government has the authority to impose disclosure
requirements to counter deceptive or misleading speech. 43 But, viewed in
light of abortion disclosures, these cases address only a subset of the police
power authority to require disclosures that ensure informed consent. The
39

Id. at 884 (citations omitted) .
See id. at 883 (calling the infonnation given in this case "truthful" and "nonmisleading ").
41
Id. at 877 (noting that the infonnation delivery requirement created "a structural mechanism by
which the State ... may express profound respect for the life of the unborn").
42
Id. at 884-85.
43
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , PA v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 251-52 (201 O); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) .
40
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information disclosures imposed upon doctors have evolved beyond
preventing deception to requiring information that a majority of the
population decides should be relevant to an individual patient's consent.
There is no basis in the Constitution to find a greater police power
authority to compel doctor speech than the speech of lawyers or merchants.
So long as the disclosures required by the state in Casey are subject to
rational basis review, similar disclosures imposed on parties to other
professional and commercial transactions must be subject to deferential
review as well, even if the disclosures are not aimed at countering
affirmatively misleading speech.
Review of the ritual circumcision case against the disclosure
requirements approved in Casey reinforces the conclusion that the
government police power to define the facts material to consent must
logically and consistently extend beyond facts necessary to correct
affirmatively misleading speech . The mohelim did not provoke the
requirement that they ensure that parents received facts relating to health
risks associated with the circumcision procedure by affirmatively
advertising that the procedure was safe . Nevertheless, the New York City
Health Department reasonably determined that knowledge of the risk of
death to their child was relevant to the parents' informed consent.
Likewise, in the absence of affirmative misrepresentations by abortion
providers, Pennsylvania required that women be informed of the
approximate age and characteristics of the fetuses they sought to abort. The
source of authority exercised by the government entities, the free speech
interests of the service providers , and the interests of the parties seeking
the services relevant to informed consent are the same in both instances,
and so, too, must be the degree of deference of a court's Free Speech
Clause review.
My third point is that understanding that governments have the
regulatory authority to define the information material to valid consent,
subject to deferential rational basis review, groups compelled commercial
speech into two categories : those in which the government compels
commercial speakers to convey information about their products or
services to potential consumers, and those in which the government
compels commercial speakers to convey other types of information or
convey information to individuals who are not potential consumers .
Grouping the cases in this way is helpful in a number of ways. It identifies
the cases that fall outside the Casey/Zauderer paradigm and require a
different justification for the government action , which may or may not
warrant low level judicial review. It also identifies the cases that fall inside
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the Casey/Zauderer paradigm but nevertheless potentially trigger
heightened review because the compelled speech impacts a separately
protected constitutional right. The cases that remain reveal that the
constitutional question in cases in which the government compels
commercial speech to inform consent reduces to determining which types
of information and manners of communicating information fall outside the
boundaries of reasonably informing a potential consumer's consent. I will
discuss each of these in turn.
Grouping the cases in terms of a government purpose to inform consent
identifies instances of compelled commercial speech that are out of bounds
and need to be separately justified because the government does not or
cannot plausibly claim that the disclosure requirements are imposed for
this reason. The compelled subsidy for generic advertising cases fall
outside the Casey/Zauderer paradigm. 44 Requirement of disclosures after
the commercial transaction, such as requirements that providers report
information related to abortions, 45 pharmacies report the types and
frequency of drug prescriptions, 46 or parties report real estate sale prices 47
must be justified by a government purpose other than defining information
relevant to consent. 48 Within cases, as well, some disclosure requirements
may fall within the Casey/Zauderer paradigm and others outside it. For
example , a requirement that a center offering pregnancy counseling post a
sign stating that "'the Center does not have a licensed medical professional
on staff" falls within the paradigm whereas a sign stating that the county
health officer "'encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult
with a licensed health care provider"' falls outside the paradigm and
requires a justification other than informing consent. 49
44
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v. United Foods, Inc.,
533 U.S. 405 (2001).
45
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (reviewing under the Due Process Clause a requirement that
providers report abortions after they occur and noting that such requirements are valid if "reasonably
directed to the preservation of maternal health") .
46
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (upholding against a Due Process Clause
challenge a state requirement that doctors disclose the names of persons obtaining certain drugs,
finding it to be "a reasonable exercise of [the state's] broad police powers").
47
Jay MacDonald, BANK.RATE .COM, Should Home Sale Prices Stay Secret?, MSN REALESTATE,
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid= 13107736 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (reporting
that 37 states require full disclosure of home sale prices).
48
See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL.U. L. REv. 555, 562
(2006) ("[F]requently the disclosure of information is required in order to promote transparent and
efficient markets.").
49
See, e.g., Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Montgomery Cnty. Resolution No. 16-1252), ajJ'd sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty.,
722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (en bane).
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Most instances of compelled disclosures are aimed at informing
consent, so recognizing these instances as presumptively valid reveals
cases where judicial scrutiny may be higher - not because the compelled
speech alone provokes heightened scrutiny, but because the compulsion
impacts a separately protected constitutional right. Recognizing that
heightened scrutiny is provoked by individual rights guarantees entirely
separate from the Free Speech Clause helps to eliminate the confusion in
the compelled commercial speech jurisprudence by making clear that in
most instances of compelled commercial speech, where the compulsion
stands alone for the purpose of informing consent to the transaction,
rational basis applies.
The most evident informed consent requirements that may burden a
separately protected constitutional right are those imposed by states on
abortion providers. The disclosure requirements do not provoke heightened
Free Speech Clause scrutiny because they fall within the state's police
power to require delivery of information relevant to informed consent to
the transaction. The separate question, however, is whether the same
information delivery requirements impose an undue burden on the right to
choose abortion prior to viability, which the substantive portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects. 50 Although the
plurality in Casey upheld the information delivery requirements before it
under both the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses, its Due Process
inquiry was more detailed and prolonged. 51 More aggressive abortion
disclosure requirements subsequently imposed by state legislatures may
violate the Constitution because they impose an undue burden on a
woman's right to choose abortion prior to viability, even though they do
not infringe upon free speech.
Video game labeling requirements are another example of disclosure
requirements that may burden a separately protected constitutional right.
The United States Supreme Court recently made clear that strict scrutiny
applies to violent video game labeling Jaws because the labels are contentbased restrictions on fully protected speech. 52 Prior to this decision, a
circuit court had addressed a challenge to a similar labeling requirement
imposed on sexually explicit video games. According to that court,
Zauderer's deferential review did not apply because the "18" sticker,
which designated sexually explicit speech, went beyond "purely factual

°Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.

5

51

52

See id. at 846-53, 870-79, 881-84, 884-85 .
Brown v. Entm ' t Merchs. Ass ' n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-39 (2011) .
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disclosures" and communicated "a subjective and highly controversial
message." 53 But governments require labels with evaluative judgments
about safety, healthfulness, and age-appropriateness in many other
instances without provoking heightened scrutiny. The reason that the
scrutiny increases when governments label video games is that the product
is separately protected as speech.
The ritual circumcision case provides a final example of a disclosure
requirement intersecting with a separately protected constitutional right.
Like video game vendors, the mohelim argued that the consent form
requirement unconstitutionally compelled them to communicate the
government's "subjective advice." 54 But, as noted above, this claim alone
is not sufficient to render the consent form requirement unconstitutional.
The reason that the mohelim's claim could possibly be successful is that, in
addition to the Free Speech Clause claim , the mohelim argued that the
disclosure requirement unconstitutionally burdened their free exercise of
religion. 55 The district court rejected this argument, finding no
constitutional violation according to the standard of review that applies to
the Free Exercise Clause .56 However, like the examples listed above, if
heightened review were to be applied to a disclosure requirement like that
imposed by the New York City Health Department, it would be because it
burdened the separate free exercise right.
Once we identify the disclosure requirements that are outside of the
Casey/Zauderer paradigm, either because they do not aim at informing
consent or they intersect with another constitutional right, we are left with
the bulk of the compelled commercial disclosure cases where the
government plausibly asserts a purpose to require disclosure of information
relevant to informed consent. This is very helpful. Now the constitutional
inquiry is narrowed to one that does not necessarily have a clear answer,
but is nevertheless quite manageable: What types of information and
manners of presentation may a government rationally determine are
relevant to consent?
Once this segregation of information-relevant-to-consent cases is made,
we can look at the cases and ask the right questions. Many, many
disclosure requirements exist, and it is possible to arrange them on a
53

Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich , 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 14, Cent.
Rabbinical Cong. of the USA & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep 't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 12 Civ.
7590(NRB) , 2013 WL 126399 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013), 2012 WL 5461809.
55
Id . at 21-27.
56
Cent. Rabbinical Cong., 2013 WL 126399, at* 17.
54
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spectrum according to the types of information required to be disclosed
and the manners of presentation in order to analyze them to determine
which of these should significantly alter the constitutional inquiry. I will
not offer a full analysis here, but will sketch the spectrum of disclosure
requirements to identify some of the questions about types of information
and manners of presentation that must be addressed.
Are there types of facts that are outside the boundary of what a
government entity can rationally determine is relevant or should be
relevant to a consumer's informed consent? The Zauderer and Milavetz
cases involved disclosures relating to price, which relates to the interest of
the immediate consumer and is undoubtedly at the heart of a commercial
exchange. Many disclosure requirements relate to product qualities, such
as requirements that sellers disclose the attributes of securities, 57 the
ingredients of a food item, 58 the hazardous chemicals in a pesticide, 59 or
the average mileage that a vehicle will attain per gallon of gas. 60 Other
disclosures relate to what is not in a product, such as the requirement that
pajama vendors disclose those that are not flame resistant 61 or the
voluntary label that milk vendors sought to apply denoting that the product
was "rbST Free." 62
Many disclosure requirements relate to the consequences of using the
product or instructions for proper use. Some of these disclosures relate
primarily to consequences to the immediate consumer, such as prescription
drug warnings and instructions, disclosure of the trans-fat content in a food
item, 63 a disclosure about cell phone radiation risk, 64 and instructions that

57
See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Oct. I , 2013) ("Often referred to as the 'truth in
securities' law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: require that investors receive
financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and
prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.").
58
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. JOI (2013) (setting out federal nutrition labeling requirements).
59
U.S. ENVTL.PROT.AGENCY,Chapter 5: Ingredient Statement Pesticides, in LABELREVIEW
MANUAL 5-10 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl /labelingilrrn/label-reviewmanual.pdf.
60
Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478 (July 6,
2011).
61
U.S. CONSUMERPROD. SAFETYCOMM'N, NEWS RELEASENo. 00129, NEW LABELSON
CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR ALERT PARENTS TO FIRE DANGERS (2000), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2000/New-Labels-on-Childrens-Sleepwear-AlertParents-to-Fire-Dangers/ .
62
Int'! Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010) (striking down Ohio ban on
"rbST Free" labels).
63
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.9, 101.36 (2013) (setting out the required declaration of trans fatty acids in
the nutrition label of conventional foods and dietary supplements, respectively).
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pajamas be worn snugly so as not to catch fire. 65 Other disclosures relate to
consequences that implicate both the interests of the immediate consumer
and of the public more generally, such as alcohol labeling that warns of the
dangers of ingesting during pregnancy or of drunk driving, 66 disclosures
that foods are genetically modified, 67 and labels that disclose car rnileage 68
or appliance energy efficiency. 69 Still other disclosures relate primarily to
disclosing the public harms that relate to the product, such as warnings on
tobacco products about secondhand smoke, 70 information about proper
disposal of products containing mercury, 71 and securities disclosures
relating to whether the investments are "DRC conflict free." 72
Beyond the type of fact presented is its manner of presentation. Any
presentation of facts is selective and depends upon the judgment of a
government entity of relevance. The question is how and why the
Constitution may limit a government entity's discretion to determine
relevance. Must the government demonstrate some sort of harm, whether
to the immediate consumer, the general public or both, from
nondisclosure? If so, to what degree of certainty must the "risk" exist when
experts disagree, as with the "risks" of genetically modified products, or of

64
See CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(reviewing a San Francisco ordinance requiring cell phone retailers to inform consumers about the
potential health risks of cell phone use).
65
U.S. CONSUMER
PROD.SAFETYCOMM'N,supra note 61.
66
See 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2012) (requiring the following statement on all alcohol beverages for sale
or distribution in the U.S. containing not less than 0.5% alcohol by volume: "GOVERNMENT
WARNING: (I) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages
during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs
your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause health problems").
67
No laws yet require that genetically modified foods be labeled for sale in the United States. See
Elizabeth Weise, Washington State Voters Reject Labeling of GMO Foods, USA TODAY,Nov. 6, 2013,
http ://www.usatoday.com/ story/news/nati on/2013/ 11/06/wash ington-state-voters-rej ect-gmo-labeing/3
450705/.
68
Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478 (July 6,
2011) .
69
The Environmental Protection Agency Energy Star Labeling System allows appliance
manufacturers to choose to qualify and display an Energy Star label. See How a Product Earns the
Energy Star Label, ENERGYSTAR, https://www.energystar.gov /certified-products/how-product-eamslabel (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) .
70
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(l) (2012) (requiring cigarette packages to carry one of nine new
warnings, one of which is: "WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers").
71 Nat ' ! Elec. Mfrs . Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state requirement that
manufacturers of some mercury containing products label them to inform consumers about proper
disposal).
72
Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(l)(A)(ii) (West 2013) (requiring companies to
disclose that their products are not "DRC conflict free," which means that a product does not contain
conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance armed groups in the Democratic Republic of
Congo) .
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cell phone use? 73 Is there some limit to the authority of government entities
to require disclosure of their evaluative judgments, such as percentage of
daily recommended nutritional value, age-appropriateness for toys and
health inspection grades for restaurants? Are there standards a government
entity must apply to reach a valid evaluative judgment? Are particular
government decision makers permitted by the Constitution to make and
mandate the disclosure of evaluative judgments more freely than others? 74
In addition, does it matter how the disclosure is presented? Many
required disclosures are explicitly normative such as "Don't use this drug
in combination with alcohol" or "Don't use this product near flame." Is it
less constitutionally suspect or more so if the warnings are explicitly
presented as government speech, such as the surgeon general's warning on
cigarette packages or the consent form required for ritual circumcision?
May required disclosures include symbols, such as a skull and crossbones
for danger, or green and red lights for food recommendations? May
government entities mandate a form of disclosure to grab the consumer's
attention or use emotion to drive home the meaning of fact? Many
disclosure requirements contain size-of-print or placement requirements
for information .75 The graphic tobacco labels recently mandated by the
Food and Drug Administration raise these questions in combination, by
imposing text, color, graphic, size and placement requirements to inform
consumers about the dangers of cigarette use. 76
These questions about the type of fact and manner of presentation
remain open and are, to some extent, vexing. They are, however, limited,
73 See CTIA-The
Wireless Ass ' n v. City & Cnty . of S.F., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1060 (N.D. Cal.
201 I) ("San Francisco ' s claimed interest falls short of protecting the public from a 'known ' carcinogen
or even from a 'probable ' carcinogen but amounts only to protecting the public from a ' possible '
carcinogen , meaning that no one yet knows if the agent (RF radiation) is actually harmful (or not). ").
74
See Tushnet , supra note 34, at 253 (noting the problem of choosing the decision maker in the
context of determining the truth or falsity of information on product labels).
75
See, e.g., FED. TRADECOMM' N, COMPLYINGWITH THE FUNERALRULE 26 (2012), available at
http://www .business.ftc .gov/sites/defaul t/files/pdf/BUS05-complyfuneral.pdf ("You must make all the
required disclosures to consumers in a clear and conspicuous manner. Your goal should be to present
the information in a reasonably understandable form . In addition , the disclosures must be legible. The
print or type must be large and prominent enough that consumers can easily notice and read the
information ."); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH& HUMANSERVS. & FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCEFOR
INDUSTRY
: WARNINGSANDPRECAUTIONS
, CONTRAINDI
CATIONS,ANDBOXEDWARNINGSECTIONSOF
LABELINGFOR PRESCRIPTIONDRUG AND BIOLOGICALPRODUCTS- CONTENTAND FORMAT(2011) ,
available
at
http ://www.fda .gov/downloads/Drugs /GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
Guidances /ucm075096.pdf (describing , inter alia, the "boxed warnings " that highlight urgent dangers ).
76
The FDA is reconsidering the content of the labels after Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court judge's injunction blocking the original versions from taking
effect. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin ., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ; Steve
Almasy, FDA Changes Course on Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarettes, CNN , Mar. 20, 2013 ,
http ://www .cnn. com/2013 /03/ 19/health/fd a-graphic-tobacco-warnings /.
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and by lining up the many disclosure requirements that exist, it is very
possible to identify common attributes and to draw principled lines.
Recognizing that most of the instances that we call compelled commercial
speech fall within the broad police power of government entities to require
disclosure of facts they determine to be relevant to consent to interpersonal
transactions cabins the inquiry: what types of facts and manners of
disclosure may a government determine are rationally related to informing
consent? The answers may not be easy, but with this question in mind, we
can clear away much of the confusion that currently exists in compelled
commercial speech cases. And that is a helpful step toward a coherent and
principled jurisprudence.

